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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DELORES ANN GALLEGOS, by
and through her Guardian ad Litem
Fidel Gallegos, and FIDEL
GALLEGOS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

1

vs.

Case No.
12312

:MIDVALE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in
the lower Court.
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a negligence case for the recovery of damages for personal injuries suffered by Delores Ann Gall

legos, age 2, when she fell against a wire fence which had
been placed on the "parking strip" in front of 570 Adams
Street, Midvale, Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court entered Summary Judgment in
favor of the Defendant, Midvale City.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the Summary Judgment '
in favor of Defendant, Midvale City, and an order re- 1
mantling the case to the Third Judicial District Court. i

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action brought on behalf of the plaintiff,
Delores Ann Gallegos, age two years, to recover damages for the loss of use of her eye. Plaintiff was injured
when she fell from a tricycle she was riding and against
a fence located on the "Parking Strip" in front of 570
Adams Street, Midvale, Utah. The defendant, Midvale
City is the owner of the parking strip (see R-51 and Exhibits I through 4 for pictures of the fence).
A consulting engineer for Midvale City testified in
his deposition that he was familiar with the area in Midvale where Adams Street is located (Deposition P. 3) ·
The witness testified that when the subdivision was ap-
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proved by the city, a strip of land approximately 50 feet
wide was dedicated to Midvale City which was later designated as Adams Street (Deposition P. 7). He further
testified that Adams Street was thereafter divided into
a sidewalk, a parking strip for grass and other improvements, a curb and gutter, and a paved strip for vehicular
traffic and that the "parking strip" could be developed
by the property owners (Deposition P. 16-17).
The Co-Defendant, Roby A. Tester, testified in his
deposition that he purchased the home at 570 Adams
Street and thereafter developed the "parking strip"
area (Deposition P. 3). He further testified that, approximately two years prior to Plaintiff's accident, he
erected a fence in question for the purpose of restricting
the children in the neighborhood from running over the
"parking strip." The Defendant did not receive permission from Midvale City before erecting the fence.
Plaintiff initiated this action on the theory that Defendant Midvale City was responsible for the injury sustained by the minor plaintiff and liable in damages pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Defendant has contended this action is
governed by the provisions of 63-30-8 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended. The Defendant further contended that, due to
this fact, the provisions of 63-30-8 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, apply and that the suit is governed by the provisions of 10-7-77 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which pro·
vides that every claim against a city for damages alleged
to have been caused as a result of the "dangerous, de-
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fective, unsafe, or obstructed condition" of any street,
sidewalk, etc., the claimant shall within 30 days after the
happening of the injury, file a verified claim with the
city. Defendant filed a motion for Summary Judgment
alleging that Plaintiff failed to file a verified claim within the aforesaid time, and, therefore, this action was
barred under the provisions of 10-7-77 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended.
The trial court ruled that the place where the accident occurred, i.e. the "Parking Strip," was a part of the
street within the meaning of the aforesaid statutes and,
since plaintiff admitted he had not filed a verified claim
with Midvale City within 30 days after the accident,
granted the Defendant's Motion For Summary J udgment. It is the entry of this Summary Judgment which
is the subject of this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT A "PARKING STRIP" IS PART OF
THE "STREET."
The Trial Court, in granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, ruled that the "parking strip"
was part of the street within the meaning of Section 10-7-77 and, therefore, that the provisions of these
statutes are applicable to the facts of this case. The stat-
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ute, the interpretation of which is the subject of this appeal, provides as follows:
Every claim against a city or incorporated town
for damages or injury, alleged to have been
caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obcondition of any street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert or bridge of such city or town,
or from the negligence of the city or town authorities in respect to any such street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert or bridge, shall within thirty
days after the happening of such injury or damage be presented to the board of commissioners or
city council of such city, or board of trustees of
such town, in writing, signed by the claimant or
by some person authorized to sign the same, and
properly verified, stating the particular time at
which the injury happened, and designating and
describing the particular place in which it occurred
As previously stated, plaintiff initiated this action
on the basis that defendant Midvale City was negligent
in failing to correct a dangerous and unsafe condition on
its property. Plaintiff contends that the "parking strip"
where this accident occurred is not part of the street
within the meaning of Section 10-7-77, and, therefore, that its provisions do not apply to this case.
This is a case of first impression in this State so
that plaintiff has been unable to find any prior decision
of the Utah Supreme Court which has considered the
precise legal issue now before this Court. Plaintiff contends, however, that the statute in question has been construed in other cases, and that the decisions in these cases
are helpful in resolving the matter now before this Court.
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In Brown vs. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P.
570, ( 1908), the Defendant, Salt Lake City, contended
that an injury resulting from a dangerous water main
and water conduit maintained by the city was included
within this statute and required the filing of a claim. In
denying these contentions, this Court considered the language of the statute and stated:
Does the claim in question here come within the
provisions of the section above quoted? We think
not. It will be observed the claims that require
presentation are of two kinds: ( l) Claims arising
out of defective or obstructed streets, alleys, crosswalks, sidewalks, culverts or bridges, or for negligence of the city authorities with respect thereto;
( 2) claims consisting of various items of account
or otherwise that may arise out of transactions
with the city, and not arising in tort. This seems
manifest from the language used with respect to
the character of the claims that must be presented
to the citv council under the second class mentioned in the statute. It seems reasonably clear to
us that, in view of the case of Dawes v. City of
Great Fall,s, 31 Mont. 9, 77 Pac. 309, the claim in
this case does not belong to the class last above
noticed. Does it come within the first class? It is
not a claim which arose out of any matters specially enumerated in the first class. Those are limited to defects in, or the obstructed condition of,
streets, alleys, cross-walks, sidewalks, culverts or
bridges. All these pertain to places and things
which the city is bound by law to maintain in a
reasonably safe condition, and the statute makes
it liable for a neglect of duty with respect thereto.
The claim in question does not come within this
class. It is one which arose out of the defective
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condition of the city's property, which is owned
and
its corporate capacity merely,
and over which it had dominion the same as anv
property owner.
w

The case of Niblock vs. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah
573, P.2d 800, involved a collision between a Salt
Lake City truck used ot repair streets and plaintiff's
automobile. Plaintiff attempted to bring the case within
the provisions of this statute contending that because the
truck was used to repair streets it was included within
the meaning of the term "street" in the statute. In refusing to apply the statute to that case, this Court explained:

"* * * 'Such street' has reference to a street
in a defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed
condition. The liability in any case would be based
on negligence. The obstructed condition of a
street give rise to no liability if the city has taken
proper precautions. The erection of adequate barriers and warnings would usually fulfill the city's
duty to the traveling public though the street be
defective."
"The statutes, as we construe them, do not authorize recovery from a municipality for the negligence of its servants engaged in repairing or
constructing street, but only where there has been
a failure on the part of the municipality to perform its duty to keep its streets free from unsafe,
dangerous, defective or obstructed conditions."
And, in Brinkerhoff vs. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah
2d 214, 371 P.2d 211, (1962), this Court reversed the
Trial Court which had held the failure to fence a canal
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was related to maintaining defective sidewalks and
streets. In its decision, this Court stated:

[2, 3] We have difficulty in seeing where the
City was negligent at all, since it has no statutory
or other duty generally to fence such a stream.
But assuming a case where there might be such
an issue, we believe that where there are no defects in the street or bridge allowing suit against ,
a city by special legislative interdiction permitting it, the expansion of the issues to include one
for negligence in failing to fence, transports the
case from the realm of statutory permission to
sue, into the area where a governmental agency
may assert the defense of immunity, and also to
assert non-negligence in failing to fence a stream
of long standing.
1

One of the clearest cases is Liberman vs. City of
A.kron, 159 N.E.2d 635 (1959). In that case the plaintiff complained of an injury which occurred on the parking strip. The statute involved was similar to the Utah
statute in that, unless the parking strip was considered
part of the "street," the city was immune from liability.
In affirming the ruling by the trial court that the statute
was not applicable, the court explained:
"In the instant case, this court, applying to the
statute in question, a strict construction as is required, concludes that the weakened tree did not
constitute a disrepair, defect or nuisance in the
'street' its{}lf, and, as a consequence, the provisions
of Section 3714, G.C. (now § 723.01, R.C.), did
not create a liability against the defendant. Likewise, there was no liability against the defendant
outside the statue, because of its governmental
immunity."
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i

In other words, as this court interprets the
above, the court is saying the place where the tree
was, to-wit, on the park strip, was no part of the
street, and the "park strip" is not included under
said statute.
"It is apparent also that the terms, 'street' and
'sidewalk' have the connotation, not of platted
street areas, but of areas actually used by the public in travel." Then follows further noted limitations on the duty of the City, and to the specific
areas to which such duty is confined.

Admitedly, most of the cases discussed herein have
been the converse of the situation at bar in that they
have been concerned with the question of whether that
state is also liable for injuries occurring on a "parking
strip" when the statute holds the state liable for injuries
on streets, sidewalks, etc. However, when the foregoing
statements of the court are construed together, it
becomes clear that Sections 10-7-77 and 10-7-78 do
not require the filing of a claim for an injury
due to the "defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition" of a parking strip. The provisions of Section 10-7 -77 re la ting to claims against a
city for damages caused by the "defective, unsafe, dangerous, or obstructed condition of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, or bridge of such cities" are the
exceptions to the general provisions of that statute providing that "Every claim, other than claims above mentioned, must be presented ... to the governing body within one year after the last item of such account or claim
accrued .... "As limiting provisions, those provisions relating to the street, etc., should be strictly construed to
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involve only the itemized areas, since to do otherwise
amounts to nothing more than judicial legislation. Furthermore, the itemized areas under the 30 day requirement are different types of areas than a "parking strip,"
as pointed out in Liberman, supra, wherein the court
stated, "it is apparent also that the terms 'street' and
'side walk' have the conotation, not of platted street areas
but of areas actually used by the public in travel" and
therefore, that the "parking strip" should not be included in them.
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the above
statutes are not applicable to the case at bar and that this
court must, as it has with other similarly statuted in the
past, strictly construe this statute and rule that the trial
court erred in determining that the "parking strip" was
a part of the "street."

POINT II
TRIAL COURT IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MISAPPLIED THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Without abandoning the argument under Point I
of this brief, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the trial
court, in granting the Motion For Summary Judgment,
has misinterpreted the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
10

1

As previously stated, Plaintiffs have never contended that this action was brought under the terms of
63-30-8 Utah Code Annotated. On the contrary, Plaintiffs theory of liability has always been that the place
where the injuries occurred was not part of the street,
sidewalk, etc., as those terms are used in that statute. The
trial court determined that this suit was barred by the
provisions of Sections 10-7-77 and 10-7-78, merely because the parking strip was part of the street.
However, 63-30-13 reads:
63-30-13.-"A claim against a political subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice
thereof is filed within ninety days after the cause
of action arises; provided, however, that any claim
filed against a city or incorporated town under
section 63-30-8 shall be governed by the provisions of section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated,
1953."
This statute merely provides that if an action is filed
under the provisions of Section 63-30-8, it is governed by Section 10-7-77. It does not make that
statute applicable to all claims against a governmental entity merely because a portion of the street
is involved in the action, as the trial court's apparently deemed that it did. Since Plaintiffs' action has
never been based on the provisions of 63-30-8 the
determination that the "parking strip" is part of the
street can, in no way, justify the Summary Judgment
rendered.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that their position is
supported when the Court analyzes all of the provisions
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of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. We contend ,
that a cursory reading of the provisions of Sections
63-30-8 and 63-30-10 clearly indicates that both statutes
may apply to the same fact situation. Plaintiffs contend
sub-section 8 applies to the case where a person is injured
by a defective condition of the street, etc., regardless of ,
whether the city had a notice of the defective condition.
That sub-section 10 applies to the situation where an em·
ployee or a city sees a dangerous condition of a street and
fails to perform the duty of repairing the same. It is this
latter situation which plaintiffs contend applies to the
case at bar. This being so, regardless of whether or not
the parking strip was deemed part of the street, the requirement to file a verified claim within 30 days is inapplicable, and the customary notice provided under the
Governmental Immunity Act would apply.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court in this case has based its entire de·
cision on the fact that the parking strip is part of the
street. Plaintiffs submit that applying the strict construction rule, the "parking strip" has no place in that
language dealing with streets, etc. Therefore, the injury
which is the subject of this case, did not occur on a street
which requires filing a notice of injury within 30 days.
Plaintiffs further assert that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act controls this case, and that plaintiff has not filed this case under the provisions of subsection 8 of that Act. Therefore, plaintiffs respectfully
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submit the decision rendered by the Trial Court is in
error, and this Court must reverse and remand the case
to the Third Judicial District Court for trial. Plaintiffs
contend that any other ruling deprives plaintiffs of their
constitutional right of trial by jury.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard C. Dibblee, of
Rawlings, Roberts & Black
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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